Today, the law is considered more pure technicality than moral edifice - whether one is talking about lawyers, tax avoiders or looters. After the putative 'death of god' (ie. the birth of science - mechanical and informatic) its prohibitions look more like locks/phones that need 'cracking'. Young people's experience of consumer hardware and software teach the lesson: They are used to the passing parade of outmoded operating systems – Windows 97, Snow Leopard etc. This is just a basic fact of consumer technology. The perspective is only compounded by the massive culture of loopholes – the exploit – known not just to hackers but to sub-hackers and, effectively, most youth in the West. Justice has been collapsed into material, ultimately disposable if desire is strong enough.
Friday, 28 October 2011
Hacking Justice?
Today, the law is considered more pure technicality than moral edifice - whether one is talking about lawyers, tax avoiders or looters. After the putative 'death of god' (ie. the birth of science - mechanical and informatic) its prohibitions look more like locks/phones that need 'cracking'. Young people's experience of consumer hardware and software teach the lesson: They are used to the passing parade of outmoded operating systems – Windows 97, Snow Leopard etc. This is just a basic fact of consumer technology. The perspective is only compounded by the massive culture of loopholes – the exploit – known not just to hackers but to sub-hackers and, effectively, most youth in the West. Justice has been collapsed into material, ultimately disposable if desire is strong enough.
Tuesday, 25 October 2011
Masks 2 / Rites of Passage
It would be
interesting to compare the demographics of illegal filesharers with those of the rioters. Both are commonly thought to be young people. But how different are the two activities? Arguably, some young rioters effected a transposition of the widespread anonymous ‘freedom to’ - piracy - practiced online into
offline space. It is provocative to consider how the underage status of
some of the participants intersects with this reading. Aware of not being seen as adults they considered themselves invisible to law. At least, this is what the
cops and press have already complained about. Thus, youth status was being deployed in a manner akin
to an online pseudonym and an offline mask concealing the ‘real person’: a ‘freedom
from’ enabling a piratical ‘freedom to’. The brazen lack of material masks worn by some
of the underage actors registers this attitude and, paradoxically, represents a claim to 'adult' behaviour.
Although age ‘protects’ from some aspects of
law (freedom from) by the same token it rules out full participation
in all aspects of civil life, such as voting etc. In this sense, young people’s ‘freedom to’ is
limited offline. The lore of teenage rebellion, invented in the mid twentieth century,
was built around a manifest rejection/reaction to this fact, performed - in part - by expressions of ‘freedom to’ through sexuality –
enacting or at least willing physical liberty in spite of hegemonic morality. Losing ones virginity in an overt way was the watershed mark of independence and a claim on adulthood even before 'legal age' was reached. Now, consider the kind
of discussions taking place online at 4chan, where every user post is credited
to Anonymous – a site which has also generated a notorious hacker network of
the same non-referential name – where losing one’s virginity has been eclipsed
by another ultimate marker of ‘freedom to’:
At what ages did the following happen to you:
1) Learn to use torrents
2) Lose virginity
The majority of the respondents posted younger
ages for torrent use than for sex.
Using torrents – at least as implied by the question here, because every
seeking is guided by what is sought – is not just any old thing. In quarters such
as 4chan it represents the ultimate immaterial freedom – the non-physical
expression of liberty. If the teenager was invented in the twentieth century -
or made visible – then at least part of its structure was
premised on overturning the trauma of social/legal/cultural invisibility. Now the key trauma is being too visible and rites of passage are
invisible/anonymous and piratical.
Masks 1 / Anonymous & Pseudonymous Identification
Another way in which online space conditioned the riot is through its commonplace cultures of
anonymity and pseudonymity. There are at least two modes of digital anonymity, and they accord to different visions of political liberty/agency. The same can be said
of online pseudonymity. The uptake of both by millions of users may precede a general/state realization that these gambits amount to actual political tactics/postions. Yet,
the spread of such phenomena in the digital sphere is nevertheless setting the stage
for the offline acts. Or, put otherwise, perhaps the government and
commentators have failed to discern the ideological dimension of the riots
because their understanding of the relationship between ‘real life’ an online
is impoverished. The ideology of the riots is playing out across the two fields and so far the state and corporate media have only
been looking for reasons in the latter.
We need a new understanding of political agency that takes into account
the liberties enacted online, with a view to understanding how these are being
enacted in and affecting real space. Until then, the riots will seem like a waking dream.
Whereas in the previous century anonymity was often seen as an alienating
condition that threatened self-worth now the vast majority of us are subscribing
to an equation of anonymity with political agency/liberty. Irrespective of ‘political’
realization on the part of individuals, most digitally connected people use and
abuse online psuedonymns – ie. filter email accounts, pseudonymous social
networks etc. This is a negative form of networked liberty/agency, an attempt
at ‘freedom from’ interference which finds its offline parallel to this
in masked demonstrators avoiding data capture by cctv cameras (and rioters looting fancy dress shops).
The positive sense of anonymous liberty, the ‘freedom to’ aspect, is
now commonplace and spreading: It is illegal filesharing. As a critical mass of
people do it the ideology of ‘freedom to’ is perpetuated. Despite its criminal/nonconformist
cachet this phenomenon has consumerist undertones – as unfettered gratification
of desire for commodities is pursued even above law of the land. The easy
anonymity afforded by the internet is not just contributing towards the economic
erosion of the entertainment industries, it is creating a much larger class of
consuming agents willing to break the law for entertainment purposes.
As Jaron Lanier notes, design underlies ethics
in the digital world and ‘People who can spontaneously invent a pseudonym in
order to post a comment on a blog or on YouTube are often remarkably mean’. Crucially,
according to him, this is not so much a function of human nature as it is the
result of bad digital architecutre. For there is such as thing as ‘troll-evoking’
design that facilitates ‘effortless, consequence-free, transient anonymity in
the service of a goal […] that stands entirely apart from one’s identity or
personality. Call it drive-by-anonymity’. Going further, Lanier worries that such designs can ‘accentuate negative
patterns of behavior or even bring about unforeseen social pathology’. In a speculative moment he displays great foresight vis a vis the London unrest.
‘It’s not crazy to worry that, with millions of people connected
through a medium that sometimes brings out their worst tendencies, massive,
fascist-style mobs could rise up suddenly. I worry about the next generation
of young people around the world
growing up with internet-based technology that emphasizes crowd aggregation, as
is the current fad. Will they be more likely to succumb to pack dynamics when
they come of age? [1]
Notwithstanding
the hyperbole about ‘fascist’ mobs, anonymous pack dynamics were certainly visible.
Ping Me Baby!
One month prior to the riots I was in a takeaway food shop on Ridley
Road market, Dalston, just metres from where a hastily convened mob would later
storm the Kingsland shopping centre in an attempt to ransack its shops. For
lack of something to read while waiting for my fast food I perused a large pile
of glossy brochures for club nights stacked next to the till. I found myself
strangely fascinated by one in particular: ‘Ping Me Baby’, it read, is the
nightclub for blackberry owners:
ANYBODY WHO IS ANYBODY HAS A BLACKBERRY AND THEY SHOULD BE
AWARDED!!!!!! SO ON FRIDAY 22ND JULY PING ME BABY IS BACK WITH THE MASSIVE FREE
BLACKBERRY PARTY!!!! EVERYBODY WITH A BLACKBERRY IS 1000% FREE B4 11PM (£5
WITHOUT) .... THIS IS GUARANTEED TO BE A ROADBLOCK AFFAIR & IF YOU'RE
CELEBRATING ANYTHING GIVE US A CALL NOW FOR SOME GREAT DEALS. SEE YOU THERE!!!!
FREE B4 11PM WITH A BLACKBERRY OR £5 WITHOUT
The reason there is an independent club night dedicated to
Blackberry owners (rather than convened as a marketing strategy by the company)
is that there is a critical mass of users in central London and this group
constitutes a particular economic body. BBM is a free – unlimited – messaging
application and in this sense represents a ‘value’ option for mobile communication.
It allows users to send one-to-many messages to their network of contacts. This
is the equivalent of a fixed price buffet and, in a similar way, a cheap
industrially produced meal – of the sort that I was buying at the chicken shop
and which the attendees of Ping me Baby! eat too. It implies consumers of
lesser means. We know that Blackberry handsets are the smartphone of choice for
the majority of British teens – 37% according to an Ofcom study conducted in
same month as the unrest?1 During the riots we were informed that
the government was in frantic talks with the makers of Blackberry (RIM) about
limiting its service in order to restore public order. One wonders if they are
now taking the time to access their customer statistics in order to
understand which ‘public’ was acting.
Blackberry/BBM is a consumer choice that, as the existence of a club
night suggests, is a potential identity – one defined by the unlimited
satisfaction of a desire (to communicate by text) available to those with
limited financial means and the willingness to create a social network mediated
by a branded consumer apparatus. The club night worked in this manner: free
entry to a carnival space for Blackberry owners, pay to play for the rest. In
fact, the riots operated in a similar fashion. In material terms the closed
network of the BBM is what allowed mobs to come together almost instantaneously.
Yet, underlying/ subtending the radical social intensity of this phenomenon was
the functional logic of consumer-technological society – physically manifest in
the kind of phones in people’s pockets and present in their desires. Note, for instance,
the apparent Freudian-slip in the advertising text: the author probably means
to say that blackberry owners ‘should be rewarded’. Instead, the grammatical
structure indicates that blackberrys should be ‘awarded’ to people who already
own them! We need not be surprised that the rioters chose to loot electronic
goods instead of smashing banks.
After some research it became clear than the club night was named after a song by a contemporary urban/rnb singer. It’s not clear if he was employed by Blackberry to create the song, if he is courting them so they might licence his music, or if he is adopting a viral marketing strategy to piggyback off consumers' identification with their mobile phones. The lack of clarity on this issue is symptomatic of viral marketing – either its practice or its influence. This discovery seems to suggest that the advent of viral marketing has in some way brought about the birth of viral looting. The announcement that it would a ‘roadblock affair’ seems less hyperbolic than the marketers first intended.
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